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CHAPTER 5  
The Evictions at Nyamuma: 
Structural Constraints and Alternative Pathways in the Struggles over Land and 
Human Rights Advocacy in Tanzania 
 
Ruth Buchanan, Helen Kijo-Bisimba and Kerry Rittich

 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The event which gave rise to the inquiry in this paper occurred in a village known 
as Remaining Nyamuma which was located on the border of the Ikorongo Game Reserve, 
immediately adjacent to the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania.
1
  Sometime in October 
of 2001, district officials informed the villagers by loudspeaker that they must leave the 
area and return to their original villages within four days.
2
  Two days after the notice 
period had ended, the District Commissioner himself set fire to a house belonging to one 
of the villagers, initiating a violent eviction of the villagers by the burning of their houses 
and fields.  In the course of the evictions, 132 households were displaced; villagers were 
injured; livestock were killed; and families were scattered in the process.  No alternative 
land or housing was allocated to those evicted.  Indeed, officials subverted their efforts to 
finding housing elsewhere by encouraging neighboring villagers to report their presence 
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1
 The village was known as ‘Remaining Nyamuma’ because most of the village of Nyamuma had already 
been relocated in 1994, due to an extension of the borders of the neighboring Ikorongo Game Reserve at 
that time.  
2
 Many of the villagers had migrated to Remaining Nyamuma from elsewhere, some as a consequence of 
land shortages in their traditional villages, others following an earlier eviction from yet another village, 
Nyanguge, in January, 2000.  See LHRC, (2002) “Protection of Wildlife and Human Rights on a Balance 
Sheet: A Case of Killings in the Serengeti National Parks” (online at: alpha.web2-netshine-
hosting.co.uk/~lhrc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=44&Itenud=56, accessed on 
August 1, 2008). 
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to District authorities.
3
  Evicted villagers were harassed by officials and prevented from 
conducting business, effectively becoming internally displaced people.
4
 
  
The case of the Nyamuma evictions is both tragic and illuminating.  It is tragic 
because, despite all the efforts on the part of the Tanzanian Legal and Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC) to publicize the plight of the affected people in the wake of the burnings 
and evictions, to characterize both the acts and their consequences as human rights 
violations, and to use the new institutional mechanism which was expressly designed to 
address human rights violations for redress, nearly eight years later there is remarkably 
little to show for it all:  800 people remain homeless and without compensation.  The 
remarkable resistance of the Tanzanian government to sustained and vigorous advocacy 
efforts in the court of public opinion as well as in various legal arenas sends a daunting 
message to funders and advocates of human rights throughout the region.  However, we 
do not understand the lesson of Nyamuma simply as a ‘failure’ of the human rights 
frameworks and mechanisms to redress the harms done in this instance.  Rather, we read 
this event as deeply entwined within a tangled web of issues, some reaching back to 
colonial times, concerning development and land policy in Tanzania.  A study of the 
evictions also discloses a more recent local history of displacement and a shrinking 
supply of land, as well as complex interconnections with international actors, multilateral 
institutions, donors, investors and tourists.  For these reasons, the tragedy of the 
Nyamuma evictions represents an opportunity for broader reflection on which factors 
enable and which block the realization of the goals that human rights entitlements 
envision and seek to secure, both within and beyond the state. 
 
 In this chapter, we use the Nyamuma case as a starting point for just that type of 
broader reflection.  In the next section, we begin with a general consideration of some of 
the challenges that face social and economic rights (SER) advocacy in Africa today.  In 
the third section, we return to the Nyamuma eviction through a consideration of the 
Report of the LHRC on its advocacy efforts in that case.  The following three sections 
seek to deepen our analysis through a consideration of a series of relevant contexts: 
property law reforms, changing land uses including the growth of both tourism and 
                                                 
3
 Multiple actors were involved in the evictions at Nyamuma.  Some, such as the District Commissioner 
and the District Police Commander, exercised authority grounded in formal Tanzanian law; others, the 
‘Ritongo’, derived their power from the customary authority of the traditional village security system.  The 
relation between these actors and the different roles that they played – in the events leading up to 
Nyamuma, during the evictions themselves, and in the aftermath - are complex. Jurisdiction between the 
formal and the informal systems of rule overlapped, the boundaries between them were uncertain, and how 
the groups exercised authority ‘in fact’ often diverged from the official account of their actual power.  
While our account doesn’t investigate these relations in detail, we do note that these issues highlight the 
limits of analyzing a legal dispute with reference to state actors and institutions and through the lens of 
formal legal entitlements alone.  
4
We are mindful in the account that follows of the ‘politics of reporting’: the question of what gets told, 
what is suppressed, why, at what cost and what benefit, and to whom. Both the violations at Nyamuma and 
the solutions to them implicate the choices and decisions of a number of actors.  At the same time, 
Nyamuma is only one incident among many that will engage these players, some of whom encounter each 
other on a repeat basis.  Because the players do not stand on a level playing field - they have different 
options, resources, concerns and relations to each other - it is worth bearing in mind that there can be no 
‘complete’ account of what has happened. 
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mining in the area, and issues relating to the funding of the Commission on Human 
Rights and Good Governance (the “Commission”) and the LHRC.  The seventh, 
penultimate section presents the results of our analysis in the form of a series of further 
questions about the complex social, economic and institutional embeddedness of human 
rights strategies.  Rather than understanding the eviction at Nyamuma as an unfortunate 
but isolated incident, our analysis leads us to the conclusion that it exemplifies much that 
has gone awry with Tanzania’s development policies from the perspective of the poor.  
Our final section, a postscript on a series of evictions that have occurred since Nyamuma 
and the responses to them by local communities and advocates, both underscores our  
argument and provides an opportunity to consider possible strategies for the future.     
 
2. Challenges of Social and Economic Rights Advocacy in Africa 
 
The evictions at Nyamuma and their aftermath exemplify the phenomenon of 
structural violence in an extreme form, and place the challenges of obtaining structural 
justice in stark relief.  The evictions also demonstrate the complex and contested 
relationship between human rights and development, particularly in Africa.  The focus on 
civil and political rights that, even up to the present time, dominates the human rights 
agendas of the international advocacy community, has rarely been seen as either 
responsive to the predicaments of disempowered groups or well-targeted to the 
challenges faced by developing states.
5
  While the ‘right to development’ was crafted 
specifically to respond to these challenges, as well as to the political and economic 
position that newly-decolonized Third World states occupied within the international 
order, the status of this right remains contested.  Despite receiving formalistic recognition 
within the international order, the right to development has suffered from its connection 
to a particular idea of the dirigiste or developmental state that has been under sustained 
ideological and institutional attack since the end of the Cold War.  But social and 
economic rights, too, often sit uncomfortably within institutional reform agendas in the 
international order that are designed to further development by enabling foreign 
investment and facilitating transborder transactions.
 6
 
 
‘Rights-based approaches’ to development represent one attempt to both mediate 
these tensions and to secure a foundational place for human rights within these 
development and broader institutional reform agendas.
7
 And at least since 1999, it has 
been uncontentious that development itself must be conceived in ways that incorporate 
human rights. Yet despite the incorporation of human rights into the development agenda 
                                                 
5Issa G. Shivji (1999) “Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Problems and Prospects” Social and 
Legal Studies 8:2 253-276 at p. 259 “On the global terrain of social and political discourse, the 
developmental and the human rights discourses were locked in battle.  They were polarized and became 
mutually exclusive.  This meant that the developmental discourse and the human rights discourse ran 
parallel.” Or later (p. 260): “the liberal theory (of rights) ruled out of court any link between individual 
rights and economic justice, while developmental theory was prepared to sacrifice individual rights in the 
pursuit of socio-economic justice.”   
6
For a collection of papers that probes this relationship, see Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, eds., Human 
Rights and Development: Toward Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
7
 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi and Andrea Cornwall, (2004) ’Putting the ‘Rights-based Approach to 
Development’ into Perspective’, 25:8 Third World Quarterly 1415. 
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and efforts to represent the promotion of human rights and development as fundamentally 
coterminous enterprises
8
, it is clear that many questions concerning the links between 
social and economic rights and the trajectory of social transformation and economic 
development policy remain.  How economic development priorities are identified, which 
groups are consulted in the process of formulating them, how policies are implemented 
and risks and entitlements allocated, and how the associated costs and benefits are 
distributed are all questions with profound implications for the realization of economic 
and social rights. Moreover, general assessments and predictions about the relationship 
between human rights and development, on their own, say little if anything about the 
prospects for particular groups; as the Nyamuma evictions make clear, they can be dire. 
 
The Nyamuma evictions, particularly when contextualized within broader 
Tanzanian economic development policies and the recent history of displacement and 
dispossession from land within the region, illuminate just how complicated and contested 
the realization of social and economic rights is likely to be.  They also provide a sobering 
check on an increasingly common narrative, which holds that the road to social and 
economic rights lies through development. By indicating how competing state objectives 
and pressures are likely to operate on human rights objectives, the evictions also provide 
a revealing guide to how and where conflicts and human rights violations are likely to 
arise elsewhere. 
 
Nyamuma provides a number of vantage points from which to consider the 
relation of the inside to the outside and the national to the transnational and international 
in struggles for social and economic rights.  For example, it illuminates some of the ways 
in which popular power might be constrained and democratic institutions turned in the 
service of projects that, while favored by powerful international institutions and forces, 
have a more uncertain grounding in local or national political choices and priorities. It 
also provokes hard reflection on what roles, for better or worse, even ‘friendly’ or well-
meaning outside groups and institutions play in advancing the HR of those they purport 
to aid.  For the irony of Nyamuma is that outside actors and institutions, some of whom 
claimed special knowledge and expertise in the field of human rights, seemed at best 
naïve about what was involved in successfully designing even a marginally effective 
national human rights regime and at worst ‘part of the problem’.9    
 
  Nyamuma also provokes reflection on the practice and challenge of SER 
advocacy itself, in particular what constitutes ‘success’.  Is it possible to read Nyamuma 
in a more positive light notwithstanding the manner in which the campaign has so far 
unfolded?  In addressing this question, it seems important to emphasize that the actors 
within the LHRC were very sophisticated: in their appreciation of the potential problems 
                                                 
8
Gobind Nankani, John Page and Lindsay Judge, “Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies: 
Moving Toward Convergence”, Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, eds., Human Rights and Development: 
Toward Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press, 2005), 475; Roberto Danino, “Legal Aspects of 
the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights: Some Preliminary Thoughts”, Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, 
eds., Human Rights and Development: Toward Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press, 2005), 
509. 
9
 David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?” (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 101-125. 
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with the human rights machinery at their disposal; in their use of publicity; in their 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of courts versus the human rights tribunal as 
a venue for litigation; in their knowledge of what was afoot at different levels of 
government; in their knowledge of customary law and traditional dispute resolution 
processes and how they motivated the villagers and affected their interactions with 
officials; and in their knowledge of the international actors and their particular projects 
and interests.  This suggests that they may have had multiple objectives, some of which 
could well have been furthered in the litigation process even in the face of their inability 
to prevail on the specific question of relief for the people who had been evicted.  It is also 
important to look beyond the litigation process, however, in seeking to understand the 
lessons of the Nyamuma eviction.  While analyses of social and economic rights often 
default to accounts about litigation, should human rights advocacy be understood first 
and foremost in this way?  Is advocacy only about courts and tribunals?  Or can it be 
more securely linked both to popular mobilization on the one hand and democratic 
transformation on the other? 
 
Our aims in this account are three-fold.  The first is to expose more fully some of 
the underlying systemic and structural sources of the dispute at Nyamuma.  The second is 
to consider  the constraints on more democratic futures and the obstacles to ‘alternative 
pathways’ to development, alternatives that might have made the dispute more tractable 
and avoided some of the problems and abuses already described, even if they did not 
eliminate the underlying conflicts themselves.  The third is to situate Nyamuma in the 
wider scheme of global governance. We are interested in the events at Nyamuma not only 
in their particularity; to paraphrase Gayle Rubin
10
, we are also interested in their 
monotonous similarity to and endless variation on conflicts and predicaments that have 
been documented elsewhere in recent years, particularly those that touch on land. 
 
3.  Framing the Issues: The Role of the LHRC  
 
The evictions at Nyamuma stand as an important test case of SER advocacy, one 
that deserves to be more widely publicized.  However, the LHRC has already issued a 
report detailing all the ways in which the evictions which the LHRC rightly call a 
‘calamity’ directly violated human rights.11  This report also documents the extensive 
advocacy efforts undertaken on behalf of the displaced villagers.  Revisiting this story in 
the context of this project and book, as we’ve noted above, reveals both the structural 
violence that is a feature of the development landscape in Tanzania, and it’s 
inhospitability to human rights advocacy.   
 
The LHRC made a strategic decision to bring the case before the newly created 
Tanzanian Commission on Human Rights and Good Governance (“the Commission”) 
                                                 
10
 Gayle Rubin, (1975) “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex” in Rayna Reiter, 
ed. Toward an Anthropology of Women (New York: Monthly Review Press).  
11
 Legal and Human Rights Centre, The Human Calamity of the Evictions at Nyamuma-Serengeti: Legal 
and Human Rights Implications (Dar Es Salaam, 2005) 
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rather than before the courts.
12
  Other options were available—it could have been brought 
as a criminal case, for the acts involved included arson and assaults, as well as the 
deprivations of property.  However, prosecuting government agents appeared rather too 
politically risky, and the likelihood of the proceedings being stalled at an early stage 
seemed high.  A second option would have been to pursue a civil case, but this also faced 
the same set of concerns about the political nature of the proceedings and the possibility 
that progress would be stalled. Finally, a constitutional case might have been brought, for 
example, invoking the protections provided by the Bill of Rights against arbitrary 
deprivations of property without compensation.  However, these cases must go to the 
High Court, which is located some distance away from the Serengeti District where the 
events occurred, and are certain to be more procedurally involved.  A test case for the 
Commission appeared to be the most attractive option, not least because it promised to be 
faster and more independent from the government than the court system.  The 
Commission, in addition to looking at the Tanzanian constitution, could also look at 
international principles, such as those elaborated in the Convention on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights.   
 
The Commission investigated, and although it dismissed the initial complaint 
which had been filed in June 2002, after an intervention from the LHRC in May of 2003, 
it convened a hearing which commenced in August of that year.  A report on the 
evictions was issued in December 2004.  That report was highly critical of the 
government, stating that numerous violations of human rights had occurred and ordering 
adequate and fair compensation to be paid to the villagers.  In particular, the Commission 
determined that the evictions involved arbitrary deprivation and uncompensated 
expropriation of property; physical assault, which led in one case to a miscarriage and in 
another to serious injury; intimidation and confinement of those from the LHRC who 
initially investigated the circumstances surrounding the evictions
13
; loss of livelihood and 
failure to provide humanitarian aid to those who were summarily cast out of their homes; 
denial of education to the affected children following the eviction; and subjection to 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, which the LHRC concluded amounted to 
torture, at various stages in the proceedings.  The report also described in detail the 
numerous procedural irregularities and contraventions of quite ordinary principles of 
                                                 
12
 The Commission came into being in 2000 in amendments to Tanzania’s Constitution Act, art. 129, and 
the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act, 2001, Act No. 7 (2001), in operation March 
2002.  Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of an Appointments 
Committee.  It is a hybrid institution, having jurisdiction as ombudsman as well as for the protection of 
human rights and good governance.  More details on the Commissions mandate and function are provided 
in section 4.1 of the LHRC Report, supra and the Commission’s website www.chragg.org.  See also 
Mambo, Jilde Alois, The Paris Principles on Establishment of National Human Rights Institutions and 
Realization of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms - A Case Study of the Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance in Tanzania(May 15, 2008). Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance 
(CHRAGG), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154642     
13
  In January of 2002, the LHRC sent out two investigators to Nyamuma.  While they were taking 
photographs and videos of the site, they were arrested and their film and equipment was confiscated by the 
police. 
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administrative justice that surrounded the evictions. Finally, it identified the government 
obstruction of the Commission inquiry as itself a violation of human rights. 
 
The LHRC report documents this series of events, including the complaint, the 
investigation and the Commission report.  However, the LHRC report also repeatedly 
touches on issues which did not form part of the core of the Commission inquiry but that 
seem clearly relevant to the evictions and to the human rights violations that ensued.  
Indeed, woven throughout the account of the evictions are suggestive, even tantalizing, 
references to issues and policies that both formed the ground out of which the events at 
Nyamuma emerged and influenced the disposition of the human rights complaint itself. A 
salient, recurring issue is conflict around land, of which the evictions at Nyamuma are 
one of the most dramatic but hardly the only instance.  Although for lack of witnesses it 
never formed part of the official complaint to the Commission, the LHRC report 
mentions two related incidents, the killing of eight ‘poachers’ and the injury of a ninth by 
game wardens in the Serengeti National Park in 1997 and another shooting in which four 
hunters were killed that occurred in the same park in 1998.
14
  These incidents were 
intimately tied up with the changing land use and new ‘security’ concerns in the 
Serengeti and the wildlife management areas.   
 
Another set of concerns that emerges in the LHRC relates to the structure of the 
Commission and to the role played by outside agencies, whether national development 
agencies, private foundations or NGOs, as funders and arbiters of human rights policy.  
These agencies and actors not only alternatively provided and denied funding to the 
Commission and the LHRC at crucial junctures; some also had competing projects and 
concerns such as wildlife preservation and the promotion of ecotourism in the Serengeti.   
 
So far, the government has failed to pay the compensation required by the 
Commission. But it has also refused to accept the findings of the Commission, alleging 
that they were “based on fabricated evidence”, notwithstanding that they were the 
product of a public hearing at which the government itself was represented.
15
  The 
Commission then requested the LHRC to take the case before the Courts, in order to 
enforce the Commission’s recommendations against the government; the case has been 
mired in appeals and jurisdictional disputes ever since.
16
     
 
                                                 
14
 These killings are documented in another LHRC publication, “Protection of Wildlife and Human Rights 
on the Balance Sheet” (2003).  
15
 LHRC, supra note 14, p. 43. 
16
That case was commenced in 2005, in the Tanzanian High Court, Land Division.  At trial, it was 
determined that the Commission’s decisions were not enforceable by the High Court, but that finding has 
now been appealed.  The appeal was finally heard by a three judge panel of the Court of Appeal on April 
22, 2008, and a decision, dated October 11, 2008 was released in January 22, 2009.  The decision allowed 
the appeal, finding that the High Court had erred in law in its determination that the decisions of the 
Commission were not enforceable by the Courts and its refusal to consider the case on its merits.  The case 
has now been referred back to the High Court on the merits.. See Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil 
Appeal No. 88 of 2006, Legal and Human Rights Center vs. Thomas Ole Sabaya and Four Others  (Dated 
Oct 11, 2008, read on January 22, 2009).  As of June, 2009, the case has not yet been heard by the High 
Court and the complainants remain displaced. .  
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The limits to what has been attained by six years of skilled and sustained 
advocacy both before the Commission and the courts are revealing and sobering.  Our 
hypothesis is that these limits are most usefully explored not as failures attributable either 
to any strategic decision that could have been made differently by the advocates or indeed 
to the decisions made within the Commission and the court system. Rather, the 
challenges to the effective realization of social and economic rights here appear to 
emanate from much deeper structural and institutional features of Tanzanian society and 
economy, as well as to the specific preoccupations of those within the wider human rights 
community, the international community in particular  Investigating these issues, 
accordingly,  requires longer, and different,, histories as well as a broader context than 
conventional litigation-oriented accounts of human rights advocacy usually provide.  For 
Nyamuma not only suggests that, as Issa Shivji puts it, “a court is not the most 
appropriate forum for resolving fundamental policy issues such as the problem of land 
tenure.”17   When we bring this broader context – development policies and priorities and 
the path of land reforms, for example – into the foreground, the evictions at Nyamuma 
and their unhappy aftermath no longer looks like an isolated, disconnected human rights 
abuse.  Instead, they seem inextricably connected both to other disputes and to wider 
social and economic developments within Tanzania, particularly the forced evictions and 
growing pressures on traditional villages from development, tourism and land reform 
projects which are increasingly common in many parts of rural Africa.
18
 Similarly, once 
we consider the preoccupations of the international human rights advocates and funders, 
the disposition of the case of the Nyamuma evictions within the national human rights 
machinery no longer looks so surprising nor does it seem unique. 
 
 
 
4.  Reforms to Property Law  
 
At the center of the Nyamuma evictions is a series of interlinked issues: land 
shortages; conflict over land and changing land use; growing impoverishment, 
unemployment and economic insecurity of the people in the Mara region; increasing 
levels of violence and a deteriorating security situation, some of which is attributed to the 
return of decommissioned soldiers and an influx of guns; and the intensification and 
reorganization of traditional activities.
19
  These issues themselves are connected to 
governance reforms in two areas: land reform and development policy centered on 
attracting foreign investment, particularly in the mining and tourism sectors (which we 
discuss in the following section).  Further, it is possible to identify a relatively discrete set 
                                                 
17
 Issa G. Shivji, (2006) Let the People Speak: Tanzania Down the Road to Neoliberalism (CODESRIA: 
Senegal) at p. 181.  While the context for Shivji’s remark was somewhat different—the legal struggles over 
customary land rights following villagization, in the mid-1980’s, its point is well-taken here.  Since many 
of those legal cases emanated from the Arusha region, they also played a role in creating the historical 
context of displacements and struggles over land that underlies the Nyamuma evictions.       
18
 The wider problem of forced evictions in Africa is documented by Paul Ocheje in “In the Public Interest: 
Forced Evictions, Land Rights and Human Development in Africa” (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 173-
214. 
19
 See the move to ‘ujamaa’ land described in LHRC, supra n. 14 at p. 9.  A further discussion of the history 
of land conflicts in the Arusha region is to be found in Shivji (2006) supra note 21 at p. 178. 
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of laws and policies concerning land entitlements and land use, implemented in recent 
years that in conjunction with other developments such as a rapidly expanding population 
markedly exacerbated the likelihood and intensity of conflicts and set the stage for the 
types of violations that arose at Nyamuma.   
 
The roots of the conflicts over land in Tanzania arguably date back to colonial 
rule of Tanganyika first by Germany and then Britain.
20
  More proximately, while land 
shortages seem to originally have been provoked by land reforms beginning in the 
1970s
21
, recent land reforms and decisions on land policy have clearly exacerbated the 
shortages and engendered new conflicts around land use.  Beginning in the 1980’s, a 
number of developments, including the expansion of the land reserve surrounding the 
Serengeti National Park, an influx of international investors in mining, notably the 
Canadian based Barrick Gold, as well as very recent developments in the privatization of 
titles to land, provide a wider context for the conflict we document here.  We would note 
also that the growing pressures on governments for land reform come from different 
sources and pull in different directions. For example “[t]he external donor driven 
pressures are aimed at facilitating the operation of a market for land, while some, at least 
of the internal pressures pull in the direction of strengthening the security of tenure of 
those already on the land.”22  
 
The starting point for the present analysis is set of policy shifts around land in 
Tanzania that commenced in the early 1990’s. At that time, a Presidential Commission, 
chaired by the well-known academic-lawyer Issa Shivji, was convened to undertake a 
major investigation into the shortcomings of existing land policies and practices.  
Although this Commission reported in 1992, the government failed to follow many of its 
recommendations in its drafting of the National Land Policy, which was enacted in June 
1995. The passage of the new Land Policy was not without controversy. After farmers, 
pastoralists and other civil society groups mobilized in opposition to some of its 
proposals,
23
 a petition was circulated and the process was slowed down to facilitate more 
careful consideration of issues such as gender and the role of customary law.  However, 
after a U.K. based property law expert with extensive consulting experience in other 
African countries, Patrick McAuslan, was hired to assist in the drafting of new land law, 
the process was quickly, and controversially, concluded as Parliament rushed into 
passage two major new Acts in 1999: the Village Land Act and the Land Act. However, 
popular reaction was at least partly positive as the reforms promised local power through 
                                                 
20
 The enduring legacy of colonial rule often includes problems with democratic legitimacy arising from 
institutions and rules that are preserved even while rulers change.  Some of this is evident in the Tanzanian 
case, particularly in relation to the regulation of hunting.  On hunting, see infra p.     See generally 
Mahmood Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).    
21
 LHRC, supra n. 14 at p. 8.  
22
 Patrick McAuslan  (2003) Bringing the Law Back In: Essays on Land, Law and Development (Aldershot: 
Ashgate) p. 249. 
23
 The opposition focused around the liberalization of land tenure that would enable land to be owned 
individually rather than communally, with the aim of promoting foreign investment.  Critics were 
concerned that this would also have the effect of displacing and marginalizing pastoralists and poor 
farmers.   See Shivji (1998) Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania (London Int. Institute 
of Environment and Development) p. 105.      
  
10 
10 
village assemblies and recognized land ownership by women. Most important for our 
purposes is that both Acts expressly direct authorities who have any reason to acquire 
land to give notice to the people using that land, and provide that the people will be 
required to move only after an agreement for appropriate compensation is reached and 
the compensation is actually paid.    
 
Notwithstanding the passage of these Acts, little progress was made in terms of 
the implementation of land reform until 2003.  In April, 2003, Hernando de Soto spoke to 
the Tanzanian president; a project on the formalization of property, or mkurabita in 
Swahili, quickly followed, funded by the government of Norway as well as the World 
Bank.  Since 2003, however, progress on titling has been slow; although an office was 
opened in 2005, titling has only proceeded in a few villages since that time.  Around the 
same time, the Norwegian People’s Aid, an NGO, began a pilot project to assist in 
determining how best to ensure that titling benefited the communities into which it was 
introduced. This organization also conducted a follow up study in a few villages to assess 
the extent to which individuals understood the implications of the formalization of titles.  
Its conclusions suggested that generally people did not understand the full implications of 
the new property rights that they were being granted.  The report is consequently critical 
of the way in which de Soto’s model has been adopted and applied in Tanzania.24            
 
It seems important at this point to say something about the specific rationale 
behind land titling, and to identify the significance of Hernando de Soto to current 
approaches to land reform, those promoted by the World Bank included. The now 
widespread efforts to promote land titling rest upon de Soto’s argument that titling is a 
means to convert otherwise ‘dead capital’ into new sources of wealth.25  Once title is 
formalized, land can, in theory, be deployed by the owner in service of wealth generation 
and greater productivity in a variety of new ways.  For example, it may be used to secure 
loans either to improve the land itself and generate higher use values from the land or to 
engage in other economic ventures.  However, land titling is also intended to facilitate the 
transfer of land and to create new markets in land. Thus, the point of titling is not merely 
to formalize existing entitlements and establish secure and unambiguous ownership.  
Rather, it is to move toward a regime of property in which land is largely freed of the 
encumbrances of complex use rights and the owner is the unchallenged and unfettered 
sovereign, able to dispose of land and exercise the full panoply of rights in respect of the 
land under his control.  For this reasons, titling typically involves not merely land 
registration but registration in the name of a single owner.  
  
Both the motivation and the structure of these reforms are deeply familiar, as they 
echo the dominant approach to land reforms for development within the international 
financial institutions.  The World Bank has made land titling a centerpiece of 
development policy in recent years, arguing that land titling promotes both growth and 
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 Nordic Consulting Group “Review of the First Phase of the Property and Business Formalisation 
Program (PBFP) in Tanzania” (16 October 2005) online at 
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poverty alleviation.
26
 Indeed, at virtually the same time as the 2003 titling initiatives were 
introduced in Tanzania, the Bank released a policy research report which contained both 
a stylized analysis of the question of land reform in developing countries and a template 
for reforms that has since been widely disseminated.  The reform template has three 
dimensions: formalization of title, individualization of ownership, and the 
commodification of land. Adopting this strategy, it is argued, will spur economic 
development that would otherwise not occur; through titling communities can be 
expected to accrue the full range of benefits that come from the conversion of land into a 
highly fungible and tradable commodity. 
 
What matters for the purposes of the Nyamuma case study and the other conflicts 
that are emerging around land in Tanzania is that these reforms are not indifferent to all 
possible uses of land, nor are they neutral as among the affected parties or actors.  They 
are particularly uncongenial to ‘traditional’ land ownership patterns, entitlements and 
uses in Tanzania and elsewhere. These include arrangements in which many persons have 
entitlements to access; land is not designated for a single use but serves multiple different 
functions; and land may be held an inalienable source of wealth and security for a clan or 
other entity over generations.
27
  Indeed, it bears emphasizing that land titling reforms are 
often explicitly designed to interrupt such uses and entitlements, and for this reason they 
systematically disfavor subsistence activities and non-tradable production as compared to  
commercial ventures that are measurably growth enhancing.
28
 
 
In addition, there is a well-documented set of risks associated with such land 
reforms, risks that tend to be systemically underplayed by those who stress the benefits of 
land titling for poverty alleviation.
29
  These include dispossession of those with interests 
under customary law; loss of land due to forfeiture for non-payment of loans; and sales of 
large tracts of land from the economically less-sophisticated or desperate to the 
financially savvy or well-positioned.
30
 The net result may be widespread changes to land 
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 K. Deininger (2003) Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction World Bank Policy Research 
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access and ownership in a relatively short period of time, leading to far-reaching 
dispossession of groups who have traditionally held land and/or erosion of economic and 
food security for groups or nations as a whole.
31
  In short, there are risks that rather than 
assist the most disempowered, land titling will enhance the economic opportunities of 
those who are already more advantaged. 
 
 In the face of such risks, the point is not that traditional land entitlements must 
reflexively be defended or that traditional uses are entitled to automatic priority over new 
ones.  There may well be a range of arguments to revisit both, and appropriate outcomes 
will likely be differently configured in different parts of the country.  It is clear that in 
Tanzania there was already a complex and contested process of land reform well 
underway when titling was initiated, some of which was almost certainly motivated by a 
desire to facilitate new or different economic activities.  Nor, as the events at Nyamuma 
disclose, is the preservation of ‘traditional’ entitlements and uses necessarily even an 
option; entire villages had already been relocated and the evictions themselves emerged 
out of conflict over land that was already an entrenched feature of the social and political 
landscape.
32
 In short, it is not change or the attack on tradition per se that seems 
problematic about the titling initiative. Rather, what leaps out is the lack of weight given 
to distributive considerations in the reform calculus and the absence of plans to 
compensate those who lost out in the titling process; the markedly foreign or external 
impetus behind the reform and the displacement of local or national imperatives and 
input into the land titling laws, despite the already extensive debate and study on these 
question; and, especially evident in the speed in which the land titling was introduced, a 
puzzling blindness to the social disruption and upheaval that significant land reform 
almost certainly entails, and hence to the possibility of conflict and suffering as a result. 
 
 
5.  Changing Patterns of Land Use: Tourism, Mining and Wildlife Protection 
 
In addition to the general aims of land reform described above, in Tanzania, the 
land reforms are also intended to enable more intensive exploitation of land for tourism 
and mining; both are designed to attract greater foreign investment and foreign exchange.  
One key illustration of the ‘open for business’ approach of the Tanzanian government 
would be the work of the Tanzanian Investment Center which ‘is reported to have 
identified some four million hectares of land under its Land Bank scheme….’ that is 
deemed ‘suitable for investment’ and is then made available to potential investors under a 
type of derivative title or lease found in the new land laws. 
33
 A seemingly inevitable side 
effect of the aggressive promotion of land for development by the government of 
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 See Kerry Rittich, “The Properties of Gender Equality”, Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, eds., Human 
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32
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Tanzania, however, has been the widespread dispossession and evictions of peasant 
landholders and subsistence farmers or miners in rural areas.
34
   
  
  The land reforms were paralleled in the mid-1990’s by the development of a 
Tanzanian tourism policy.
 
 In 1996 a Master Plan for the implementation of the new 
tourism policy was announced.  In 1999, an updated Tourism Policy was adopted by the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and in 2002, an updated Master Plan was 
published.
35
  It is noteworthy that the 2002 Plan comments briefly, but critically, on the 
recent land reforms: “The new land laws in Tanzania will place considerable importance 
on liaising/getting agreement with local communities regarding land use for tourism 
purposes.  However, there appears to be lack of clarity with regard to the interpretation 
and implementation of these laws.”36   
        
The Serengeti is located within the Northern Wildlife Area, which has long been a 
focal point of these activities, both because it is an internationally-known tourist 
attraction and because traditional uses of land are perceived to conflict, or do in fact 
conflict, with the objective of expanding the revenue generated by tourism.  While the 
policies contain some requirements for community based eco-tourism initiatives, the 
evidence so far suggests that these provisions have provided little assistance in 
minimizing these conflicts nor have they lead to significant benefits to communities.  
Often community benefits are merely cosmetic, such as the building of a classroom or 
some other small piece of infrastructure. Where communities are given a more 
meaningful opportunity to be involved in the development of local integrated 
conservation and tourism programs, these benefits may well increase.  However, there are 
countervailing concerns that the overall trajectory of development, including the 
privatization of control over the wildlife areas described below, will continue to subvert 
these efforts or push them to the margins.  As the LHRC 2005 report noted, it is ‘easier to 
relocate people rather than animals’.37 Both the structure of the land reforms and the 
explicit embrace of tourism and mining as development strategies suggest why any 
conflict over land use has usually been resolved in the animals’ favor, and people have 
increasingly found themselves at the losing end, facing either eviction or punitive 
measures from officials for engaging in traditional activities such as hunting.  
 
It is unclear that the people in the Serengeti district have ever been unable to live 
compatibly with wildlife, something that is unsurprising given that their hunting practices 
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are largely restricted to hunting small game for food.
38
  However, as both the local 
population and the wildlife management areas around the National Park have expanded 
over the past several decades, access to traditional sources of sustenance and livelihood 
have been curtailed or eliminated.  As part of this intensifying pressure on land use in the 
area, the Ikorongo Game Reserve on the northwest border of the Serengeti National Park 
was expanded in 1994, to its current size of 1,867 square kilometers, and its status 
upgraded from game controlled area to game reserve.  The expansion of the reserve 
(along with other park and reserve expansions in the area) reduced the land available for 
cultivation and pastorage.  It has also intensified the risk of disease transmission from 
wildlife to people.  It was this expansion that originally led to the eviction of most of the 
village of Nyamuma, for which the former residents continued to seek compensation until 
the time of the Remaining Nyamuma evictions in 2001.  Another eviction, of the nearby 
village of Nyanguge in January of 2000, also increased the pressures on land in the area 
as some of those villagers settled in Remaining Nyamuma, and also sought compensation 
from the government.   
 
Game reserves (GR) and game controlled areas (GCA) are both managed by the 
Department of Wildlife. However, the residence of people and their livestock is 
prohibited in game reserves, while local human activities (apart from hunting) are 
allowed in game controlled areas.
39
  For this reason, the shift in 1994 of the Ikorongo 
reserve from a CGA to a GR designation in order to facilitate other activities was a 
significant step in dispossessing the local communities, hunting in particular.  Hunting in 
GR is allowed by permit issued by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism.  Hunting outfitters gain exclusive access (concessions) to 
specific GR from the Director of Wildlife.  The Director of Wildlife exercises 
considerable discretion in the granting of these concessions, which effectively take the 
form of leases permitting exclusive access to a specific wildlife management area for a 
specified period of time (generally five years).       
 
The Ikorongo reserve is located within a unique and globally remarkable 
migratory corridor --- between the Serengeti National Park and Kenya’s Maasai Mara 
National Reserve.  It is this factor that may have prompted its expansion and upgraded 
status in 1994.  Government records from the Wildlife Division Hunting section in 2003 
reveal a hunting concession over three areas, Ikorongo, Grumeti and the Fort Ikoa Open 
Area, registered to a company named VIP Hunting Safaris Club.
40
  VIP Hunting Safaris 
is the former name of the company Grumeti Reserves, Ltd. which currently is the holder 
of the concession in these three areas; Grumeti Reserves is wholly owned by American 
financier/commodities trader, Paul Tudor Jones.  Although its access to the land is held in 
the form of a hunting concession, Grumeti discontinued hunting on the property 
sometime in 2002, and instead has developed the property as a wildlife viewing area. The 
three areas over which Grumeti now appears to exercise exclusive access total 
approximately 340,000 acres, and the area, with its three high end lodges, stables, tennis 
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courts and spa, is now being marketed as “one of the world’s most luxurious eco-tourism 
resorts”.41   
 
Given the exclusivity of the tourism that is now being marketed in the very site, or 
very close to the evictions, it is easy to see why these people and their activities might 
have become an issue for the government in 2001, if this venture were at the proposal 
stage at that time.  Despite the fact that both the people and their subsistence activities 
have long co-existed with  wildlife in the area, the activities are increasingly construed as 
a threat to both the wildlife and the tourists who come to view them, while the villagers 
themselves are styled as ‘poachers’, ‘vagrants’, ‘criminals’ or simply a ‘security risk’.  
These villagers were also sometimes referred to as ‘Kenyans’, a rhetorical move clearly 
intended to call into question their entitlement to anything at all, despite the fact that their 
citizenship has never seriously been in issue.   It would seem that here, however, the real 
source of the current conflict  is not between the local people and the animals, but rather 
between outside interests and perhaps national elites, both of whom stand to profit from 
the abundance of wildlife in the area and the extraordinary spectacle of the annual 
migrations, and those of the locals. Tanzania’s tourism policies reflect the importance of 
investors and tourism to its foreign exchange revenue. Yet despite the tendency to 
conflate such policies with the national interest, the question of whose interest is served 
by such policies remains: the costs to local inhabitants are clear while it is uncertain that 
they will derive any countervailing benefits. The representation of locals as alternatively 
criminals or outsiders is a discursive strategy designed to delegitimate or/ exclude their 
concerns and opposition in the policy-making process; the effect is to exacerbate their 
disadvantage. 
 
In addition to tourist development related to wildlife viewing in the Serengeti District, 
two other significant external drivers of development in this region are gold mining and 
hunting, and although they don’t appear to be directly implicated with respect to the 
evictions in this case, they are certainly implicated with respect to a pattern of evictions 
in the region and in the rest of the country.  Recently in Tanzania there have been a 
number of incidents of forcible dispossessions of locals related to mining operations, and 
violent conflicts between small-scale miners and residents and multinational companies 
such as the Canadian based Barrick Gold and Placer Dome.  A legal advocacy group 
based in Dar es Salaam, the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), has been 
investigating the complaints of local communities displaced by mining and advising 
locals, with some limited successes.
42
  
 
The most egregious incident occurred in 1996 at the Bulyanhulu Gold mine, now 
owned and operated by Canadian-based Barrick Gold (then operated by Sutton 
Resources) where at least 30,000 miners were forcibly evicted, and more than fifty of 
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them were killed, buried by a bulldozer in the process of the eviction.
43
  No compensation 
has yet been provided to the displaced in that instance, notwithstanding ongoing domestic 
and international NGO mobilization concerning the issue.
44
      
 
More proximate, both geographically and temporally, are evictions related to two 
gold mines located in Tarime District (next to Serengeti District): the North Mara Gold 
Mine (also operated by Barrick) and the Africa Mashariki Gold Mine (parent company 
Placer Dome).  The North Mara mine commenced operations in 2001, after the forced 
evictions of local villagers.  Since that time, village leaders and prominent locals have 
been harassed, arrested and imprisoned, further village lands have been appropriated by 
the dumping of waste and rubble onto those lands (without notice or compensation) and 
up to six villagers have been shot by company security guards (one was shot on the 
grounds of the local primary school, after he was alleged to have stolen some gas or oil 
from the company).  The most recent victim was shot in the back by a security guard in 
June, 2006 after he allegedly entered the mine complex.  After complaints at the 
Mashariki Gold Mine related to inadequate compensation paid to evicted villagers, in 
2003, LEAT was successful in obtaining an order for an injunction against the mine from 
the Commission.
45
 
 
6.  Funding Issues: NGOs, Bilateral Donors and the Human Rights Commission 
 
A final set of issues relates to the structure of the Commission and the role of 
outside funders in its creation and operation and in the work of NGO’s such as the LHRC 
within Tanzania.  The Commission was created in 2000 following pressure from the 
Citizen’s Coalition for a New Constitution (the “Coalition’), a group of over 50 
Tanzanian NGOs for the creation of a body to address human rights complaints.
46
  The 
catalyst for the formation of the Coalition was the 50
th
 anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  However, it was also greatly facilitated by the provision 
of funding to the Tanzanian government earmarked for the establishment of just such a 
commission, including the building to house it.  The government originally proposed to 
simply rename an existing inquiry body, one that was designed to deal with 
administrative malfeasance and other complaints against government functionaries.   
Although the body was redesigned somewhat as well as renamed in the face of a counter-
proposal from the Coalition, concerns remained about the capacity of the Commission to 
effectively deal with human rights complaints articulated by the LHRC and others.  For 
example, there were no human rights specialists on the Commission and there was no 
secure, independent source of funding for its work that could be insulated from 
government pressure and spending priorities. 
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The adequacy of the Commission’s structure was a source of dispute between the 
internal human rights groups and external funders in the Nyamuma case, the first human 
rights complaint to come before the Commission. At the same time, the reaction of the 
government to the results of the inquiry suggests that it remained resistant to the mandate 
of Commission.  These disputes and differences provide a point of entry into the question 
of what the different groups hoped to achieve through the Commission; they also open a 
window on their possibly diverging aspirations for the human rights enterprise as a 
whole.   
 
One issue is the degree of naïve ‘rights formalism’ exhibited by international 
human rights funders and NGOs.  The LHRC was concerned from the beginning about 
the structure of the Commission and whether it would provide an avenue for real redress 
for the victims such as those at Nyamuma.  The funders by contrast insisted that all that 
was necessary for the Commission to function well was to staff it with ‘good people’.  
However, the actual path that that the Nyamuma case took suggests that the LHRC’s 
concerns about structure and funding were not misplaced: the first ‘inquiry’ by the 
Commission, a cursory review that involved no public hearings, determined that there 
was no factual basis for the claims and that the people had not been evicted but had 
moved voluntarily. Even when the second, ‘real’, ‘public’ inquiry was convened after 
interventions from the LHRC, the problems were not over.  While it was possible to find 
funding for the Commission itself, it proved impossible to extract resources from either 
governments or NGOs for basic humanitarian relief to the villagers evicted from 
Remaining Nyamuma.  This was not because the plight of the villagers lacked either 
urgency or severity – for example, some of the villagers were already dying, some from 
hunger, others from lack of medical care.  In addition, funds were required to enable the 
villagers to testify at the inquiry. This too was not a minor issue. The villagers who had 
been displaced from Remaining Nyamuma were located in the far western part of 
Tanzania.  Even when the hearing was convened in a town closer than Dar-es-Salam, 
considerable funds were still required to enable the villagers to travel the 110 kilometers 
to the hearings and to ensure them basic accommodation while they were there.47 
Although the government had been involved in setting up the Commission, it not only 
failed to provide the funding needed to adequately conduct the inquiry, it rejected the 
Commission’s findings in the Nyamuma case on the theory that it had been ‘misled’.  
Moreover, it refused to provide alternate housing or any other form of humanitarian relief 
to the displaced people as the Report had required; the LHRC’s effort in the Courts to 
force the government to comply with the Commission’s recommendations is ongoing.   
 
Resistance on the part of governments to inquiries that place them in an 
unsympathetic light and/or cost them money is neither unusual nor difficult to 
understand.  In addition, resistance through bureaucratic and procedural subversion is a 
common reaction to institutional reforms that are unpopular, especially those that are 
externally imposed.  
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What of the external funders? Why did the failures – whether measured in terms 
of the suffering of the affected people or the deficiencies of process that were evident 
throughout the Nyamuma inquiry - not evoke a more sympathetic response, especially 
given that such issues typically lie at the center of the concerns of human rights groups? 
Did the mere existence of the Commission constitute a victory for human rights in the 
eyes of the foreign donors? 
 
      Another possibility is that the funders themselves harbored some degree of 
ambivalence if not conflict of interest around Nyamuma, at least to the extent that 
addressing the concerns of the LHRC in that case required them to confront government 
actors directly over their actions and (non)responses. In general, outside funders, 
especially other national governments do not speak out on controversial issues for fear 
that they will be perceived as interfering in domestic affairs.  Individual ambassadors 
may be willing to act or to speak out on certain issues; when the LHRC ran short of 
money, it was the Embassy of Sweden that was forthcoming with some limited funds.  
The ‘diplomatic’ role adopted by most state funders may also explain why it was so much 
more difficult to obtain funds for humanitarian relief to provide food and housing for the  
displaced people than it was to obtain funding for legal actions.               
 
           Should the other, non-state outside funders have weighed in at this point on the 
side of the Commission? On the side of the LHRC?  In the name of human rights, on 
behalf of the villagers themselves? It is worth considering why they might have been 
reluctant to do so. Outside funders typically depend on the sufferance of the government 
to remain in the country.  Unless they have points of leverage that they are willing to use, 
this is likely to restrain them from engaging in open conflict with the government. This is 
especially true if they have a number of projects on the go.  In such cases, they may be 
unwilling to jeopardize them all for the sake of one, no matter how compelling it seems 
on its own merits.
48
   
 
       Foreign funders may also have goals and aims that diverge from or actually 
conflict with those of local human rights activists, a possibility that emerges especially 
clearly in the context of the uninvestigated killings of the ‘poachers’ by the wardens in 
the wildlife management area around Serengeti National Park.  These ‘poachers’ were 
locals who had traditionally relied on small animals in the park as a source of food.  With 
increasing emphasis on the Park as a site for international tourism, however, there was 
growing pressure at the national and international levels to ‘make the Park safe for 
tourists’.  It is this perceived conflict between tourism and local subsistence activity that 
seems to have set the context for the shootings of nine alleged poachers in the wildlife 
management area just outside the park in 1997.
49
  The LHRC had commenced an 
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investigation of the shootings, and despite difficulties in obtaining funding for this 
particular case, did bring the complaint to the newly created Commission.  However, the 
complaint has not proceeded, in part for lack of witnesses but also, it seems, because of 
political sensitivities.  There were only two survivors, one of whom was aged 15 at the 
time, and their whereabouts are not known.  Further, the LHRC received an 
unprecedented visit from the German ambassador shortly after the killings in which he 
commented on the negative publicity that had been received by the Frankfurt Zoological 
Society connecting it to the incident.
50
  In the meeting, he made reference to ‘basket 
funding’ offered for the election year of 2000, which was essentially a pooled fund 
available to NGOs from a number of state donors including the Germans, and asked 
whether the LHRC had applied. Although the LHRC had up to that point generally been 
successful in its funding applications, following the Ambassador’s visit, the LHRC 
discovered that it had been unsuccessful in gaining access to that pool of funds.    
 
 Domestic NGOs and activist groups are almost invariably engaged in conflict and 
contestation with governments; indeed, they are often organized precisely for this 
purpose.  However, as is the case with foreign governments, it is not atypical for 
international human rights or humanitarian groups to try to avoid issues that are 
perceived to be ‘political’, either on the theory that it will jeopardize their neutrality or 
out of pragmatic concern for their capacity to continue doing the work they want to do. 
This may cash out in a variety of ways.  Such groups may prefer to focus on one issue 
and avoid another; they may prefer more narrowly targeted campaigns, rather than 
campaigns that aim at broad social or political transformation.
51
  In addition, they may 
have an eye on the international stage as much as the domestic audience, if only because 
they may have donors or backers of their own that they seek to satisfy or placate. 
 
In addition, it may also be the case that external funders simply have different 
priorities and projects than local human rights groups. Well before they become involved 
in a particular dispute in a given country, external organizations are likely to be in 
possession of a well-elaborated sense of what it means to promote human rights or 
humanitarian goals; they may also have entrenched ideas about how to go about doing so; 
they may already have a conception of the ‘problem’ that they must address in any given 
country or context. For example, international actors, whether international NGOs, 
international institutions, or states, may be as interested in establishing a ‘culture of 
human rights’ and implementing human rights processes and institutions as in responding 
to any particular issue or abuse.  One reason is that objectives like promoting human 
rights and the rule of law are increasingly part of broader governance projects to which 
such actors may be committed. For a range of reasons, outside funders typically come 
armed and girded for particular types of battles and are prepared to face some enemies 
but not others. Hence, some human rights issues may register more powerfully on their 
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from the Frankfurt Zoological Society, which has a longstanding relationship with the Serengeti National 
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LHRC had also been concurrently investigating the incident, no LHRC representatives had made such 
claims to the media.    
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radar screens than others and, notwithstanding the capacious reach of human rights norms 
at the formal level, some concerns may not register at all, It may be very difficult to alter 
or dislodge prevailing ideas and intuitions about how to engage in human rights work, 
even where evidence on the ground suggests something sharply at odds with these 
premises. Instead, initial assumptions about what human rights ‘are’, in form and content, 
are likely to powerfully shape the agenda and may simply function to screen some issues 
out or render them invisible within the framework of human rights entirely. 
 
This concern is especially salient with respect to social and economic rights. 
Because they so often touch on distributive conflicts, social and economic rights are often 
perceived to be either political per se, or so inextricably connected to popular and 
legislative choices and processes as to be the proper province of politics rather than law 
or morality.  Notwithstanding the Vienna Declaration and the supposed indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights to which the international community is now 
committed, the geo-political battles which marked the field of human rights until the end 
of the Cold War continue to leave their mark.  There is still a hierarchy among rights, and 
Western foundations and HR groups, the source of most HR funding and influence in the 
international arena, continue to prioritize civil and political rights. As a result, many 
economic and social conflicts and crises simply do not evoke a response framed in the 
language of rights.
52
  
 
It is worth observing that international NGOs and funders are not simply 
autonomous decision-makers in respect of human rights; rather they themselves may be 
hostage to some degree to projects, priorities and trends emanating from other institutions 
and actors.  Because they themselves operate in a complex international environment, 
NGOs and funders may be channeling rather than authoring concerns about corruption 
and human rights abuses, or reiterating ‘common sense’ about human rights and good 
governance, now in wide circulation on the international plane.  Where the funders are, as 
in this instance, governments or international institutions, the likelihood that external 
influences and complex motives are part of the decision-making process is still greater. 
Even assuming agreement on what constitutes the proper focus of attention, here human 
rights are likely to be only one concern of many and one moreover that takes a back seat 
to others. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that in the case of Nyamuma, the LHRC found 
it much more difficult to get funds for humanitarian relief than it did for human rights 
advocacy. 
 
7.    How Institutions Matter to Human Rights Strategies 
 
If one of the challenges of social and economic rights is securing substantive 
relief and resources rather than mere ‘process’ rights for those who are dispossessed and 
disempowered, another is institutionalizing what often seem like fragile and contingent 
victories.  Here the hope is that, rather than merely local and evanescent, success can be 
structurally grounded in order to carry some promise of broader, and lasting, 
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 For example, Human Rights Watch, one of the largest and best-known international HR NGOs, only 
began its forays into social and economic rights less than 10 years ago, and they remain a small part of its 
mandate to this day. 
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transformative change.  Nyamuma reminds us that in order to realize this aspiration we 
may be compelled to reflect in the most basic and thoroughgoing of ways on what 
institutions matter to human rights and why.  For many things were indeed being 
‘institutionalized’ in the run up to the Nyamuma evictions, including the  Commission, a 
variety of land reforms, and new development strategies concerning tourism and mining. 
Although the latter two may seem marginal or irrelevant to the realization of human 
rights and did not, in any event, form any part of the inquiry process, this analysis points 
to a quite different set of conclusions: land reforms and development strategies set in 
motion a series of events, and in so doing, appear to have played a significant and 
sometimes pernicious role in the violations that occurred at Nyamuma.  And while human 
rights institutions are often styled as ‘the answer’ to abuses in cases such as Nyamuma, it 
is clear that that would be an unsafe conclusion too.  
 
Nyamuma also raises the relationship of critique to reconstruction. It seems 
fruitless to try to imagine full-scale alternatives that could reliably have prevented the 
evictions and subsequent violations from occurring.  But the institutional discussion need 
not end here. On the theory that alternative pathways don’t come from Mars, that it is 
indeed possible to ‘hew stones of hope’ from present conditions and possibilities, part of 
the task must involve identifying the concrete decisions that were made about 
institutional design, the alternatives that were available and in some cases even on the 
table, and the consequences of choosing one route versus another.  
 
There is also the question of who controls or influences the land reform process 
and how it is that revolutionizing land policy comes to have the priority that it now so 
often has. How, for example, did it come to pass that land reforms were instituted by the 
Tanzanian Parliament so shortly after de Soto’s visit in 2003? Where did those reforms 
engender conflicts with other government policies, and what might have been done 
differently if those conflicts had been recognized? How carefully, if at all, was the full 
range of consequences considered? And if such reforms are retained, what might need to 
be added to the regulatory and policy agenda to forestall or ameliorate problems such at 
occurred at Nyamuma? 
 
Whether, and to what extent, these reforms and policies will result in any larger 
benefits for Tanzanians as a whole still remains in question.  However, it is already clear 
that they are creating profound, and growing, disparities among different groups.  It is 
these growing disparities which seem likely to generate ongoing human rights conflicts, 
conflicts that will not be remedied by attention to conventional human rights norms, 
objectives and institutions alone. The central issue here is the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of Tanzania’s path to development.  At present, the vast majority of the costs of 
development are being imposed on subsistence-based local communities in areas such as 
the West Serengeti, groups of people who can least afford to bear them. Up to the present 
time, little or no effort has been made to mitigate these losses, either by the government 
or by the other parties who now benefit from those changes.  Instead, beneficiaries of the 
new policies, whether they are foreign investors or merely better positioned Tanzanians, 
are now able to call on the state to enforce and sometimes, as Nyamuma illustrates, to 
assist in the practice of evictions and dispossession.  
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There are inherent local challenges arising from the limited land base and the 
growing population that are likely to put continuing pressure on subsistence activities and 
generate some degree of conflict over access to land.  However, it is clear that both the 
land reform and development policies, some of which were the result of outside pressure 
from commercial interests and multilateral agencies, have exacerbated the inter-group 
conflict within Tanzania.  As a result, there is an immediate need to deal with the local 
resentments and distrust bred from years of disenfranchisement, as well as that arising 
from the generations of resettlements that have occurred. The characterization of 
particular locals as lawless and dangerous to tourists and animals, or both, covers over a 
set of conflicts, real and imaginary, over land use and development policy.  Efforts to 
criminalize these actors merely obscure rather than address issues that are likely to 
persist, generating further human rights concerns and violations and intensifying rather 
than ameliorating the harm to those who are on the losing side of the deal.  It seems 
unlikely that these conflicts can be successfully addressed without revisiting some of the 
basic decisions about land reform and development policy and probing the consequences, 
both expected and unexpected, that they have generated so far.   
 
Land reforms in the style of de Soto are now repeatedly sold as a ‘pro-poor’ 
policy.  Yet as the struggles over land document, the routine experience is that as 
previously ‘valueless’ land becomes recognized as an investment opportunity, most 
Tanzanians see little benefit. Despite the promise of both growth and poverty alleviation, 
such reforms create the very risks of dispossession that are now so clearly materializing 
in Tanzania, risks that are intensified when particular plots of land are specifically 
identified for development and banked for future exploitation by outsiders. The 
consequence is that land reforms persistently generate not widespread empowerment and 
engagement in more sophisticated and remunerative economic activity on the part of the 
economically disenfranchised, but the perverse consequence of greater concentration of 
wealth and power in the elite. 
 
There are alternatives, and they need not be understood simply in terms of the 
choice between reform and stasis or between development and tradition.
53
 Consider, for 
example, the other land reform proposals in circulation, such as those tabled in the Shivji 
Report. They may very well have been more attentive and sensitive to the interests of 
those who are now being dispossessed, and it is certain that land reforms can be made 
more attentive to those interests. If the effect of such alternatives is to restrain the easy 
alienation of these lands or prevent their use and development without wider consultation 
and agreement among the affected parties, then that may be the point: securing agreement 
for new land uses under different legal and institutional arrangements may compel 
concessions and compensation to those who would otherwise simply lose out.  
 
It is worth recalling that until recently, land reform for development was primarily 
about the distribution of land. By contrast, land reform in conjunction with contemporary 
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development policy almost invariably means reform to land law. Given that legal reforms 
often effectively redistribute land, the question of distribution may need to be put back on 
the agenda explicitly. The argument for doing so seems compelling where, as in 
Tanzania, land and other reforms lead not only to the ‘hard’ evictions such as occurred at 
Nyamuma but also to what Mwambi Mwasaru has called ‘soft eviction’,54 that is, the 
effective expulsion, through urban upgrading or other policies, of communities from the 
land they have traditionally used.   
 
Real consultation, and substantial control of the decision making process, is also 
key.  Although it has officially been part of Tanzanian law for some time now that 
communities be given a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of the 
lands on which they reside and to thereby directly reap some of the economic benefits of 
that process, these laws have not been implemented effectively to date.
55
 Notwithstanding 
some token efforts at the implementation of ‘benefit based’ approaches to development, 
locals (rightly) believe that the gains they are receiving are far outweighed by the costs 
that are being imposed upon them.  How different this picture might look in the Serengeti 
if the requirements for real consultation and participation were taken seriously is 
something we can only guess at, although there are real lessons from other contexts that 
are surely of use here.
56
 As the more recent history of land struggles in Tanzania 
discloses, the extent of countervailing pressure and the bargaining power of the groups, 
and hence the outcome of conflicts such as those like Nyamuma, can sometimes be 
successfully altered by the factors such as the disclosure of previously hidden 
information; collective learning leading to organized rather than sporadic responses; and 
shifts in external alliances and the tactics those alliances enable.   
 
 
8. Postscript: Hope After Nyamuma? 
 
As the people of Nyamuma have struggled in court to have their rights to their 
land recognized and compensated, unauthorized takings of land by the government for a 
variety of purposes - foreign investment, environmental protection or conservation - have 
continued to occur throughout the country.  However, there has been a significant change 
in the ways that both local communities and advocacy organizations respond to these 
events.  Tanzanians are now more likely to vigorously contest such dispossessions, and 
more empowered in their capacity to do so, while advocacy groups like the LHRC are 
more strategic in the ways they are intervening to assist the people affected.   It is in these 
developments, detailed below in the context of several recent disputes, that it is possible 
to identify a ray of hope emerging from the ongoing tragedy of Nyamuma.   
 
                                                 
54
 See Mwambi Mwasaru, this volume. 
55
 For example, the LHRC (2003) Report documents that the 1998 Wildlife Policy incorporates an 
emphasis on community based conservation, which permits local people to have access to wildlife 
resources through the creation of Wildlife Management Areas.  The Report observes that “the concept and 
practice of community based conservation has not yet been fully adopted and practiced in many parts of the 
country”, notably, the western corridor of the Serengeti National Park.  (infra section  6.6)    
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Johannesburg, see Achmat, Budlender and Forbath, this volume. 
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The following five scenarios detail some of the ways in which the experience of 
the Nyamuma evictions has changed peoples’ responses to conflicts over land. In general, 
they reveal greater strategic engagement with both legal and political processes, from 
selective use of court processes to parliamentary interventions; increased reliance upon 
media to publicize disputes; continued advocacy on the domestic and international fronts; 
and no small amount of direct action against officials who formerly used force against 
local populaces with impunity.   
 
The first concerns the Hadzebe in the Yaeda Chini valley in Mbulu District of 
Manyara Region, who are internationally recognized as the oldest group still living 
traditionally in the Rift Valley. The Hadzabe’s ability to maintain their traditional hunter-
gatherer way of life is increasingly under threat by the incursion of other groups into their 
traditional territory as well as by the granting of hunting permits in the area by the 
government.   Recently, the District Commissioner, working with other groups who have 
settled in the valley, attempted to enter into an agreement with a foreign investor for an 
exclusive lease for big game hunting.  This would have left the Hadzabe people without 
access to the land for hunting or gathering and, consequently, entirely without 
sustenance. When they first became aware of the proposal, the Hadzabe contacted the 
media and international organizations that work for minority rights in order to publicize 
their opposition to it.  A Commissioner from the Commission was sent to investigate, and 
after meeting with the District authorities, he became persuaded of the merits of the 
investment, and subsequently, convened a meeting in which he encouraged the people of 
Yaeda Chini to support the investment. That meeting was disrupted by protest.  The 
abortive meeting and the very public protest was then publicized in the national media, 
which facilitated efforts by the Hadzabe to secure more support from advocacy groups 
both within and outside the country.  The vigorous advocacy on the part of the Hadzabe 
leaders led to the arrest of their two spokespersons on a charge of inciting the people.  
However, the arrests silenced neither the Hadzabe nor the advocacy groups, including 
international NGOs and faith-based organizations, working on their behalf. Instead, a 
further onslaught of urgent appeals to both the government and the investor on behalf of 
the Hadzabe eventually led to the withdrawal of the proposal by the investor.   
 
Two differences from the Nyamuma case are worth noting here.  First, the 
government did not use force to evict these people but rather attempted negotiations 
through the District Commission and then the Commission itself with the less affected 
villagers in the area.  Second, and perhaps as a consequence of this approach, the people 
were made aware of the looming threat of dispossession and with this knowledge and the 
support of NGO’s and the media, were able to successfully challenge the authorities even 
where other groups were already siding with the government.   
 
In another area known as Kiteto in the same Region of Manyara, the District 
Council decided to earmark an area in and around a cluster of seven villages as a village 
conservation area. According to the Village Land Act, it should be the villages, through 
their village assemblies, who decide to demarcate such areas.  The law further allows 
several villages to agree among themselves to demarcate land for certain common use 
among the villages.  In this case, however, the villagers were not consulted.  When they 
  
25 
25 
were asked to move to give way to the conservation area they refused and turned to the 
media and to the LHRC for legal support and intervention with the regional police.  
Notwithstanding these efforts, a forced eviction was subsequently conducted.  The 
immediate response from the villagers was to seek further publicity in the national media 
and to seek an injunction against the evictions while they filed a suit challenging the 
process of demarcating land as a conservation area without their involvement and their 
subsequence forced eviction.  The injunction application was successful, allowing the 
people to stay on their land until the main suit is determined.  The greater effectiveness of 
the legal advocacy in this instance can be traced to the greater awareness of the potential 
for a legal challenge on the part of the villagers.  While the people in Nyamuma only 
sought help after they were already out of their area, the villagers of Kiteto acted 
immediately in approaching the media and the LHRC.  For its part, LHRC was willing to 
take this case on, and successfully argued the injunction application, thus ensuring that 
unlike the villagers of Nyamuma who have remained homeless and dispossessed 
throughout their lengthy court battle, these villagers will be entitled to remain on their 
land until such time as the government is able to make its case for the eviction 
successfully to the court, which given the clear violations of provisions of the Village 
Land Act, seems unlikely.    
 
A third episode concerned a group of pastoralists who had moved to a valley 
known as Ihefu, which is also a water catchment area.  The authorities decided, rather 
abruptly, that cattle grazing had been responsible for environmental degradation in the 
area and ordered thousands of the Ihefu to move within a very short time.  The affected 
people were required to hire trucks at their own expense to move the cattle, and the scale 
and speed of the demanded relocation caused significant expense and loss of livestock.  
This relocation, like the others, incited an active opposition.  More than twenty pastoralist 
groups came together to challenge the government’s actions.  They informed advocacy 
groups and sent petitions to their Members of Parliament, leading to a discussion of the 
matter in Parliament.  The groups are also pursuing a legal challenge in the courts to seek 
compensation for their lost property.   
 
While the preceding examples emphasized the prompt and effective pursuit of 
legal and administrative advocacy strategies, aided by publicity, in a growing number of 
instances, the people are prepared to articulate even more directly their opposition to 
proposed government actions to remove them from their land.  In a suburb of Dar-es-
salaam known as Chasimba, there is a legal dispute currently before the courts between 
the residents and a company over title to the land.  Before the legal proceedings were 
concluded, the District Commissioner held a meeting with the residents in which he 
attempted to convince them to prepare to move from the area.  Although the residents 
were angered by what they took to be the assumption that they would lose in court, the 
District Commissioner persisted in claiming that they would need to move, inflaming the 
group.  The meeting became so hostile that the District Commissioner had to be rushed 
out of the area.  This type of confrontation of a political leader by the people is 
unprecedented in Tanzania, and is evidence of a new level of empowerment of the 
people.  Fortunately, such encounters do not always end with the threat of violence.  In 
  
26 
26 
two other recent examples, meetings between the people and high level political figures 
have led to successful resolutions of the conflicts in question.   
 
In Misenyi, a group of people were being requested to vacate to give way for a 
proposed (international) investment in a ranching enterprise.  Although the groups 
opposing the investment were pursuing various channels to have it shut down, it was not 
until the President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, visited the area in person that a 
successful resolution for the people was obtained.  On hearing of the difficult situation 
from the people themselves, and how they were exhausting their meager resources in 
order to defend their lands in court, the President publicly declared that they should be 
left alone. A similar encounter took place in another area of Dar-es-salaam known as 
Kibamba. Here, residents had originally agreed to relocate for some development 
initiatives, but had not been able to reach agreement on a fair compensation.  The matter 
was heavily reported in the media, and eventually came to the attention of the Minister 
for Lands, who then decided to hold a meeting with the residents.  At the meeting, when 
an official report was read out which the people claimed contained inaccuracies, they 
shouted down the official and provided their own evidence directly to the Minister.  The 
meeting led the Minister to order that the residents be allowed to stay on their land until 
adequate compensation was decided upon and paid out, and to order a police 
investigation against his own officers.  
 
All of these incidents have occurred in the years after the evictions at Nyamuma. 
As awareness of the illegality and political resistance to the perceived injustice of these 
acts has grown, it has become more difficult for the government to simply displace 
people from their land by force. Tanzanians who are adversely affected are actively 
resisting these evictions through recourse to administrative mechanisms, the courts, 
international civil society alerts, domestic and international media outlets and even 
‘shouting down’ local officials. Perhaps because the pressure exerted through these 
means has become more common and more organized, there has been a willingness by 
higher authorities such as the President and the Minister to intervene in some of these 
cases.  
 
This new mobilization, some of which has prevented planned evictions altogether 
and some of which has merely altered the terms on which they occur, represents a 
significant achievement in itself. Yet the evictions are merely the most visible, and 
extreme, consequence of a larger set of transformations, raising a further question: what 
are the prospects that this mobilization will, on its own, come to exert pressure on the 
larger regulatory and policy initiatives behind the evictions?    
 
 Here, the issue is complicated. When the 1999 land laws were enacted the popular 
reaction was positive, as the reforms promised power to the people through the village 
assemblies, and recognized land ownership by women.  The challenge now is to unpack 
the constellation of concerns occasioned by a larger set of laws on investment and 
development, including the development of land banks, as it is these laws collectively 
that provide the legal basis for evictions. In addition, there is now a hidden time bomb on 
the horizon: mkurabita, or land registration. 
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The LHRC is currently engaged in outreach work to sensitize people to the risks 
entailed by land registration. This has not been easy: fed a steady diet of claims about its 
benefits, people are anxiously awaiting registration in order to access the capital that it 
may provide. Moreover, registration has some undeniable attractions. The new land laws 
have made it possible to register customary land, something that is appealing to 
customary land holders who had sometimes faced the onerous task of claiming back land 
from individuals who had attempted, and sometimes succeeded, in registering land 
individually. Especially attractive is the idea that when land is registered, not only will 
title be secure, land can be used to obtain cash.   
 
The main concern of the LHRC has simply been to caution people about the dark 
side of these developments, however obscure the risks may seem. As the LHRC has 
discovered in two districts, Handeni and Bagamoyo, in which mkurabita has been 
attempted, in general people are not aware of the ultimate implications of registration. In 
the excitement over the prospect of obtaining loans, they typically fail to appreciate that 
they could lose their land if debts remain unpaid, and they may not consider that although 
registration entitles them to sell their land, the result may be that they then have no 
alternative land to cling to.  Most Tanzanians are poor; they will be tempted to take out 
loans or even sell the land in order to pay for necessities such as school fees or to engage 
in petty business ventures. In most cases, it will not be easy to repay the loans.. Thus, the 
specter of permanent indebtedness or dispossession looms. Apart from the risks to 
individuals, there are systemic risks to communities as a whole as a result of alienation of 
land on a widespread scale.  Pastoralists, in addition, face distinct threats to their way of 
life.  Not only is the idea of individual title alien to these groups, land registration is very 
likely to force pastoral groups to give up access to the lands on which they have 
traditionally hunted and to settle for a mere piece of land in exchange.  
 
The weapon at hand to contest the manner in which land registration is 
proceeding may be the very empowerment that has come out of the mobilization around 
the evictions. Once land registration is recognized as a matter of economic security and 
even survival, those with stakes in the reform process can be expected to organize and to 
resist as they have in the case of evictions. However, given that registration is at a 
relatively early stage in Tanzania and that concrete internal illustrations of the risks are 
few, effective mobilization will almost certainly require activists to draw lessons from 
other contexts where the experience with registration is more advanced.  This suggests a 
new, and different, role for international advocacy groups: the provision of information 
about other contexts in which land registration has been introduced and the consequences 
that have ensued; the identification of the actors behind these initiatives; and the sharing 
of strategies for engagement, and if necessary, resistance to these processes, ideally in 
advance of their introduction rather than after the fact.
57
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Yet there is a further question: can local action on its own, even assisted in this 
manner, be expected to disrupt the overall project of transforming land uses, especially 
the trend toward rewarding foreign investors with large land grants? Mobilization 
sometimes stops the evictions; it may impede the implementation of land policies in 
particular locales; or it may mitigate the effects of reforms. But, so far, it is not altering 
the general drive to commodify land in the name of greater productivity and growth. Nor 
has it yet defeated the campaign, waged both directly and collaterally, against those 
engaged in subsistence activities wherever those activities are perceived to conflict with 
initiatives to foster market-centered investment and growth.   
 
This is where the conflicts continue. Although the normal expectation may be that 
a government has the interests of its people at the forefront, what we observe in some of 
the examples is action by the government against its own people, in some instances even 
contrary to the law. For example, even the Commission, which is supposed to guard 
against government violations of rights, was used against the people in the case of the 
Hadzabe.  It is clear that the government and particular populations may have divided 
interests, although reforms are typically couched in terms of economic benefit to those 
populations. To use the words of one Minister interviewed by the LHRC, “The Arab is 
coming there to put up a camp for his leisure, to rest and to do some small hunting, as 
there is not much in terms of animals to hunt.  But it will be for the good of the people, as 
he will make a road and build a school which is needed by this people.” However, roads 
and schools are of little interest to people who have lost their land. 
 
The government of Tanzania remains under a clear inducement to facilitate 
foreign investment because the revenue it generates enables the reimbursement of loans. 
Yet while we may assume that either government or some government officials are 
excited by the possibilities offered by openness to foreign investment, it is also worth 
considering the external groups and institutions driving this venture forward. As the 
widespread introduction of land reforms projects that look much like those now in 
operation in Tanzania indicate, whatever its own desires and responsibilities in respect of 
land policy and land use, the government is caught up in a development trend not entirely 
of its own making.  To the extent that they are part of the equation, ultimately, the 
external forces which have proved to be such powerful catalysts to land reform may have 
to be engaged as well. 
 
What would an international campaign challenging the forces promoting such 
policies and reforms look like? Could we imagine an international campaign, for 
example, that eschewed selective advocacy on behalf of the environment and the wildlife 
and, instead of positioning those engaged in traditional economic activities as a threat, or 
even as a development problem to be ‘solved’, imagined them as the very parties to be 
supported? 
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Would such a campaign still be framed in the language of human rights? If so, in 
the name of what rights would it be advanced? At this point, we can safely say that any 
such campaign, because it is destined - even designed - to engage dominant ideas of  
property rights and development could expect to meet either countervailing rights claims 
or competing interpretations of what respect for those rights entails.  If so, would 
prevailing in the end require recuperating other vocabularies of struggle – solidarity, self-
determination, socialism
58
, or even sustainable development for example – or inventing 
new ones not yet on the horizon? 
 
Beyond the vocabularies of moral responsibility, political struggle and economic 
development, on what regulatory and policy territory would such a campaign rest?  What 
positions would it advance in respect of land and development, for example?  Might it 
endorse heterodoxy rather than orthodoxy in law and policy, thereby sanctioning greater 
diversity and experimentation and empowering those at the local and national level who 
have reason to prioritize other legal rules and policies?
59
  
 
Moving into this territory engages a host of interconnected issues about growth 
and distributive justice. It would almost certainly involve new analytic and discursive 
work, as well as engage types of knowledge and expertise – collective, professional and 
political – that lie largely outside the purview of the human rights community as it is 
currently constituted. In short, it would be a big step, especially for international human 
rights advocates. Moreover, the complexities of effective and sustained SER advocacy 
are not to be underestimated, as this and the other chapters in this volume have 
illustrated.  However the LHRC has already signaled that, in Tanzania, this is where at 
least some of the important action now lies.  In their own actions, local activists and 
advocates have issued a clear challenge to advocates and actors on the international plane 
as well. 
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